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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:
KENNETH DALE ASHTON

Case No. 940696-CA
Priority Classification 15

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, RUTH ELIZABETH ASHTON

ARGUMENT
I.

MRS. ASHTON IS NOT CHALLENGING THE ACCURACY AND VERACITY OF
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. RATHER, MRS. ASHTON
MAINTAINS THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ACCURATELY
REFLECTS ALL OF AND THE ONLY EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
The Appellant (hereinafter "Mrs. Ashton") did not file a

trial transcript when she brought this appeal because the only
evidence presented at trial is accurately portrayed by Judge
Lewis' Memorandum Decision and the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact.

In their brief, Respondents (hereinafter "Heirs") claim

Mrs. Ashton is asking this court to retry the facts of this case.
Respondent's Brief, Point V p.10, 31. Quite to the contrary,
Appellant clearly states in her brief that "Mrs. Ashton does not
question the veracity of the Trial Court's factual findings. . ."
Appellant's Brief, p. 19.
As advanced by Appellant's Brief, Mrs. Ashton maintains that
the Trial Court's factual findings do not rise to the level of

clear and convincing evidence of Mr, Ashton's (hereinafter
"
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A S OPPOSED TO THE ASSERTIONS MADE IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, THE
CURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT AND CANNOT, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, RISE TO THE LEVEL OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
DECEDENT DID NOT INTEND TO GIVE MRS. ASHTON VALID AND
PRESENT JOINT OWNERSHIP INTERESTS IN HIS PROPERTY.
The evidence relied upon

he Ti;i a] Court j n coming
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ruling that Decedent did not intend to give a present ownership
interest in the various properties titled in Decedent's and Mrs.
Ashton's names does not rise to the level of clear and convincing
evidence*

Evidence rises to the level of "clear and convincing

evidence" when it leads to the conclusion that the truth of the
matter asserted is highly probable.1
Mrs. Ashton asserts that the evidence presented at trial,
accurately depicted in the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and
addressed by Judge Lewis in her Memorandum Decisionf does not and
cannot, as a matter of law, lead to the conclusion that it is
"highly probable" Decedent did not intend to create the specific
interests identified by title to the various jointly held
properties.2

Even a cursory examination of the very facts

relied upon by the Trial Court supports Mrs. Ashton's contention.
Inasmuch as Respondent's Brief has misrepresented Mrs. Ashton's
position with regard to what evidence the Trial Court relied upon
in coming to its decision, a review of Mrs. Ashton's actual
position regarding the Trial Court's factual findings is proper

x

E.g. Riley Hill Gen. Contr. v. Tandy Corp. 737 P.2d 595, 602
(Or. 1987)("To be clear and convincing, evidence must establish
that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."); Davis
v. Dept of Labor & Industries, 615 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Wash 1980)
(Clear and convincing standard of proof denotes quantum of proof
less than "beyond a reasonable doubt" but greater than a
"preponderance of the evidence.")
2

It is questionable whether the evidence relied upon by the
Trial Court even meets the preponderance of the evidence test.
Proof by "preponderance of the evidence" means that the fact finder
must believe that the facts asserted are more probably true than
false. E.g. Riley Hill Gen. Contr. v. Tandy Corp., 737 P.2d 595,
602 (Or. 1987).
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Fact, the only intent addressed relates to worksheets prepared
and relied upon by Decedent when determining what percentage of
his and Mrs* Ashton's property would be devised to their
respective children pursuant to their wills. At the time
Decedent was developing his will, Decedent may very well have
desired to divide jointly held property pursuant to the
percentages calculated on the worksheets.

However, what

Decedent's intent was at the time he developed his will is only
minimally relevant, at best, in attempting to defeat Mrs.
Ashton's survivorship rights in the various jointly held
properties.
Likewise, Paragraphs 15-32 of the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact relate to the actual preparation and execution of Decedent's
and Mrs. Ashton's identical wills. Again, the only references to
or discussions of "intent" found in Paragraphs 15-32 are those
addressing what concerns were raised in order to have their
respective wills generated by Carolyn Driscoll, the attorney who
originally drafted the parties' wills, as well as the subsequent
addendum.

Nowhere in Paragraphs 15-32 can one find indications,

let alone clear and convincing evidence supporting a factual
finding, that Decedent did not "intend" to give a present
possessory interest to Mrs. Ashton in his properties at the time
title to property was taken and recorded in both of their names.
What Decedent's intent was at the time he developed and executed
his will, standing alone, is totally irrelevant to Mrs. Ashton's
survivorship rights in jointly held property.
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Brief of Appellant, Point XXI(B), p.16-18 provides a complete
discussion of why the law requires those challenging a surviving
joint tenant's right of survivorship to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that at the time tile was taken as joi nt
tenants, no valid joi nt tenancy was intended

survivorship interest in the jointly held property*

Regardless

of Decedent's intent at the time these beneficiary designations
were executed, they are simply immaterial to establishing what
Decedent's intent was at the time property was taken in Decedent
and Mrs. Ashton's names.
When examined in light of ALL of the surrounding factual
findings, Paragraphs 38 and 41 of the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact exposes the legal errors that occurred in the Trial Court.
Nowhere in the Trial Court's Findings of Fact are there
paragraphs expressly relating to, or even remotely determining,
what Decedent's intent was at the various times Decedent caused
title to be taken in both his and Mrs. Ashton's names. Yet,
without any reference to evidence regarding "intent" at the times
title was taken in joint tenancy or as tenants in common,
Paragraph 41 of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact leaps to the
determination that the "total facts and circumstances further
establish that the Decedent did not intend to give [Mrs. Ashton]
a present interest or ownership in his property, that the joint
tenancies and tenancies in common were created for convenience."
The only evidence presented at trial was with regard to
"intent" surrounding Decedent's development and execution of his
will.

It is obvious error, as a matter of law, to thereafter

determine that this same evidence of "intent" is clear and
convincing evidence of Decedent's "intent" at all other times,
such as the times when Decedent caused title to be taken in both
his and Mrs. Ashton's names.
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Finally, Paragraph 38 of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact
is a very good example of the dilemma facing the Trial Court,
which lead to its erroneous ruling, as a matter of law.
Paragraph 38 states " . . . the vast majority of the Decedent's
property was transferred into joint tenancies or tenancies in
common with [Mrs. Ashton].

The Decedent expressed a desire to

preserve property for his children's benefit.

This is

inconsistent with giving TMrs. Ashton1 a present ownership
interest."

(Emphasis added).

First, this finding shows Decedent

understood property title consequences and therefore chose not to
convert all of his property into jointly held property with Mrs.
Ashton.

Second, this factual finding establishes a concern that

should have been explicitly resolved prior to defeating Mrs.
Ashton's survivorship interest in the jointly held property.
Paragraph 38 demonstrates that the Trial Court knew the mere
act of transferring title on the various properties into his an
Mrs. Ashton's names was evidence, though rebuttable, of
Decedent's "intent" to convey a present interest in the property
to Mrs. Ashton; otherwise, no inconsistency would exist.
Pursuant to Utah law, the proper way to resolve this
inconsistency is to require those challenging the validity of
various titles to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, at
the time the titles were created, the grantor did not intend to
transfer a present ownership interest in the property.
of Appellant, Point II, p. 10-13.

See Brief

In the present case, the Heirs

failed to present any evidence, and the Trial Court failed to
8

find any evidence, concerning what the Decedent's intentions were
at the various times he cause titled to be taken in his and Mrs.
Ashton's names as joint tenants or as tenants in common.
In effect, Respondents are arguing that the proper way to
resolve the inconsistency is for the Trial Court to first
determine what Decedent•s intent was at the time he executed his
will.

At that point, all that is left for the Trial Court to do

is use that finding to supplant and supersede whatever Decedent's
actual intent may have been at the various times he caused title
to be taken in his and Mrs. Ashton's names.4

After a review of

Judge Lewis' Memorandum Decision and the Trial Court's Findings
of Fact, one can only conclude that the Trial Court accepted the
Heirs' argument and ruled accordingly.
Inasmuch as the facts of this case failed to address what
Decedent's intent was at the various times title was taken in
either joint tenancy or as tenants in common, the facts relied
upon by the Trial Court do not and cannot, as a matter of law,
lead to the conclusion that it is "highly probable" that Decedent
did not intend to give Mrs. Ashton a present ownership interest
in the properties.

Therefore, the Trial Court's legal ruling

that Decedent's estate should include all properties titled in
4

In effect, by adopting the procedures it did, the Trial Court
is allowing Decedent and the Heirs to modify completed inter vivos
transactions by will, which is contrary, not only to various
express statements of the law, but also contrary to the legal
principles and notions which support the doctrine of joint tenancy.
For example: Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(5) (1993) states: A right of
survivorship arising from the express terms of the account or under
this section, a beneficiary designation in a trust account, or a
P.O.D. payee designation, cannot be changed by will.
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Decedent's and Mrs. Ashton's names, regardless of whether title
was held as joint tenants with full rights to survivorship or as
tenants in common, is improper.

The Trial Court's ruling should

be reversed because that ruling is not supported by any evidence,
let alone clear and convincing evidence, of Decedent's intent at
the time title was taken in Decedent's and Mrs Ashton's names.
III. AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE, MRS. ASHTON
IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER LITIGATION COSTS, AS AN EXPENSE OF
THE ESTATE, AND MRS. ASHTON'S COUNSEL IS ENTITLED TO
REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDER TO THE ESTATE.
At the close of the new trial following remand, Mrs. Ashton
moved to recover attorney compensation and litigation expenses,
from the time of the Heirs' earlier appeal through to the
present, as an expense of the estate. Judge Lewis summarily
denied Mrs. Ashton's motion and ruled such expenses were
individual expenses, not those of the estate.

See, e.g.. Brief

of Appellant, App., Judgment, Paragraph 4.
The Heirs now assert that Mrs. Ashton did not preserve her
right to appeal this issue because, at trial, Mrs. Ashton failed
to present evidence as to the reasonableness of the compensation
sought or any evidence showing that the expenses were incurred in
good faith.

Brief of Respondent, Point VI, p.34-38.

It appears

the Heirs mistakenly believe, or so they assert, that it is the
duty of the personal representative to present evidence at the
time of trial as to the reasonableness of the compensation sought
and evidence that the conduct of the personal representative was
commenced or carried out in good faith. Id.
The law concerning any personal representatives' right to
10

recover attorney's compensation and litigation expenses is very
clear in the State of Utah.

Contrary to the Heirs' assertion,

Mrs. Ashton did not present evidence regarding the reasonableness
of compensation or litigation expenses because, as the language
of Utah Code Ann. §75-3-718(1) indicates, Mrs. Ashton was under
no obligation to do so. Pursuant to Section 75-3-718(1) of the
Utah Probate Code, unless and until an interested person objects
to the compensation requested, reasonable compensation shall be
the amount requested.

In the present case, no one, including the

Trial Court, raised an objection to the reasonableness of the
amount of compensation or litigation expenses requested because
no amount was ever given inasmuch as the court Ordered accounting
of Decedent's estate had not yet been completed by Mrs. Ashton,
as personal representative.
Furthermore, the Heirs failed to present any evidence at
trial that Mrs. Ashton had acted in bad faith, and the Trial
Court failed to make any findings regarding whether Mrs. Ashton
was acting in good faith or not - the issue was simply not
addressed at trial. At the close of the trial, the Trial Court
simply denied Mrs. Ashton's request that attorney's compensation
and litigation expenses be included in her accounting of the
Decedent's estate, which the Trial Court ordered her to complete.
As is apparent by reviewing the Trial Court's Findings of Fact,
no evidence was ever even presented regarding either the
reasonableness of compensation and expenses or as to whether or
not the litigation expenses where incurred in good faith.

11

The language found in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-718(1) and § 753-719 speak in terms of mandatory reimbursement for reasonable
attorney's fee's and litigation expenses incurred in good faith.
Unless objected to by an interested party, the amount of
compensation and litigation expenses requested is deemed to be
reasonable and proper. Accordingly, had the Heirs or any other
interested party objected to Mrs. Ashton's request at trial, the
Trial Court would then have been in a proper position to make
such a ruling.5

However, since no interested party objected to

Mrs. Ashton's request for attorney compensation and reimbursement
for litigation expenses, the Trial Court erred by summarily
refusing to grant Mrs. Ashton's request.

This Court should

reverse the Trial Court's ruling on this issue and order that
compensation and litigation expenses be included as an expense of
the Decedent's estate and paid accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Ashton does not question the veracity of the Trial
Court's factual findings.

In fact, Mrs. Ashton believes the

Findings of Fact adopted by the Trial Court are actually an
extremely accurate and complete indication of ALL evidence that
was actually presented at trial. What Mrs. Ashton contends is
that the Trial Court's factual findings do not support the
Conclusions of Law or the Judgment that was based on these
5

The Trial Court would then be obligated to employ the
procedure set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985
(Utah 1988) to determine the reasonableness of the amount of
attorney's fees sought. See Brief of Appellant, Point IV, p.20-24
for detailed explanation of this procedure.
12

findings.

The findings certainly do not rise to the level of

clear and convincing evidence that, at the various times Decedent
caused title to be taken in both his and Mrs. Ashton's names,
Decedent did not intend to give Mrs. Ashton a present possessory
interest in that property.
Contrary to Respondent's assertions, what Mrs. Ashton is
asking is that this Court analyze the reported facts as they
relate to the subsequent rulings of law entered by the Trial
Court.

The facts relied upon by the Trial Court in reaching its

legal ruling do not and cannot, as a matter of law, lead to the
conclusion that it is "highly probable" that Decedent did not
intend to create joint ownership properties at the time title was
taken.

Therefore, the Trial Court's ruling that Decedent's

estate now includes all properties titled in Decedent's and Mrs.
Ashton's name, regardless of how that title is held, is improper
as a matter of law.
Additionally, under Utah law, unless and until requests are
objected to, Utah courts are obligated to grant proper requests
for compensation from individuals who have provided services to
an estate, as well as their requests for litigation expenses
incurred in good faith on behalf of the estate.

Because there

were no objections to Mrs. Ashton's request that attorney
compensation and litigation expenses be included in Decedent's
estate, and there are no findings supporting a denial of her
request, the Trial Court was obligated, under Utah law, to grant
Mrs. Ashton's request.
13

Based on the foregoing arguments, Mrs. Ashton respectfully
asks this Court to reverse the trial court and rule that
properties titled in Decedent's and Mrs. Ashton's names as joint
tenants with full rights of survivorship be excluded from
Decedent's estate and that properties held as tenants in common
be dealt with according to the provisions of the Utah Probate
Code.

Additionally, Mrs. Ashton respectfully asks this Court to

rule that in completing the court Ordered accounting on
Decedent's estate, Mrs. Ashton be entitled to include attorney
compensation and litigation costs as estate expenses, which
should be paid from the estate accordingly.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 7 ^ day of February, 1995c

Attorney for Appellant
Ruth Elizabeth Ashton
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT RUTH ELIZABETH ASHTON were
hand-delivered or mailed, by first class mail, postage prepaid,
on

this Oflt day of February, 1995, to the following:
John K. Rice, Esq.
Attorney for Respondents
Steven Jay Ashton, et al.
17 North Main Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Bv:
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